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Comment David Cook
Introduction
The authors have written a compelling case arguing that Hong Kong will
continue to thrive as an international ﬁnancial center even as the further
development of the People’s Republic of China could result in the growth
of a rival ﬁnancial center in Shanghai. Certainly, current trends are very
positive. The ﬁnance, insurance, and business services (FIRE and business
services less real estate) sector made up less than 10 percent of Hong
Kong’s economy in 1990 but had grown to more than 17.5 percent in 2005.
This indicates both that integration into the mainland economy has not, in
fact, dampened the ﬁnancial industry in Hong Kong but also that contin-
ued performance of the sector is crucial for the overall macroeconomic
performance of the Special Administrative Region (SAR).
The authors make three basic points based on past historical data, pres-
ent trends, and a structural forecast of the future. First, in the prewar era,
both Shanghai and Hong Kong were measured as signiﬁcant international
ﬁnancial centers. Second, by many recent measurements, the depth and
breadth of Hong Kong’s ﬁnancial markets continue to exceed that of
Shanghai’s. Third, China’s international banking assets are likely to grow
dramatically in the future as the economy develops. If Hong Kong’s share
of China’s international banking continues to hold steady, rapid expansion
of Hong Kong’s banking will continue.
A central contribution of the chapter is a well-founded prediction of the
size of China’s external banking assets. The authors estimate a statistical
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and Technologymodel of a country’s external banking assets as a function of its level of de-
velopment and some other macroeconomic variables using cross-country
data. Capital controls have inhibited the acquisition of nonoﬃcial foreign
assets by Chinese banks. This model can then be used to predict what will
happen to China’s external banking assets as it normalizes its integration
with world ﬁnancial markets and continues to develop economically. The
authors predict dramatic growth in China’s external bank lending. This
seems reasonable and may even underestimate ﬁnancial ﬂows from China.
China has acquired a large positive net international investment position
relative to its level of development. It would be interesting if the authors
could test how a history of positive net ﬂows will increase the positive gross
ﬂow of funds by including the net international investment position or av-
erage of current account surpluses as an explanatory variable. It may also
be useful to evaluate how well the model works for Taiwan, which is an-
other economy that developed with large surpluses.
The authors conclude by noting that if Hong Kong’s share of China’s ex-
ternal banking assets stays constant, then Hong Kong’s ﬁnancial sector
will also enjoy dramatic growth. Given the relative growth rates in the two
economies, continued growth in Hong Kong’s ﬁnancial sector of this sort
will require the further development of Hong Kong as a ﬁnancial entrepôt
for China as a whole or as a Chinese domestic ﬁnancial center. The follow-
ing discussion will focus on this aspect of Hong Kong and China’s future
development.
Financial Markets
The authors present evidence that along many dimensions, ﬁnancial
markets in Hong Kong are more developed than those in Shanghai. While
their case is compelling, there are some caveats as to whether this implies
that Hong Kong can continue to develop its role as a ﬁnancial entrecôte.
These caveats might be examined sector by sector.
Commercial Banking
Banks located in Hong Kong are much larger in aggregate than are the
banks in Shanghai. At present, Beijing is the geographical center of com-
mercial banking in China, not Shanghai. As reported in Bowers, Gibb, and
Wong (2003), 60 percent of the domestic deposits in the Chinese banking
system are held at the four top banks, all of which are majority controlled
by the central government. The big four state-owned banks were spun oﬀ
of the People’s Bank of China at the outset of China’s reform process and
are still headquartered in Beijing, not in Shanghai.
The authors also note that there are large gross international ﬁnancial
ﬂows that are channeled through Hong Kong’s banking system. A large
fraction of the assets of Hong Kong banks are categorized as Due from
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has been much larger than the demand for foreign currency loans leaving
Hong Bank banks with an overhang of foreign currency. Prior to 2001, the
Hong Kong Association of Bankers set legally enforced ceilings on inter-
est rates on Hong Kong dollar deposits while foreign currency deposits
were competitive (see Schenk 2003). As the dominant deposit taking banks
in Hong Kong are part of multinational conglomerates, shipping the excess
foreign currency to overseas branches is an eﬀective way to eliminate cur-
rency mismatch. A large fraction of the assets of Hong Kong banks are,
thus, Due from Banks Abroad. There are also a large number of foreign
multinational banks operating in Hong Kong that have been prevented, in
the past, from building branch networks by regulations (since repealed) re-
ferred to as the “One Building” rule. Borrowing from overseas branches
can be a key source of funds for these banks. Therefore, a large fraction of
Hong Kong banks’ liabilities are Due to Banks Abroad.
Ironically, these gross international ﬁnancial ﬂows through the banking
system have been encouraged by regulations that have limited competition
in the domestic banking sector in Hong Kong. Whether international ﬂows
of this type can be a sound basis for believing that Hong Kong will act as a
ﬁnancial entrepôt for China is questionable. The possibility certainly ex-
ists. In 2005, about 20 percent of Hong Kong banks’ liabilities to banks
abroad are to mainland banks, a fact attributed to mainland banks acquir-
ing Hong Kong dollars and lending them back in the Hong Kong money
market (Hong Kong Yearbook 2005, chapter 4). In addition, about 8 per-
cent of obligations of banks abroad to Hong Kong banks overseas assets
are from mainland banks. As the mainland banking system liberalizes,
Hong Kong banks are likely to have a comparative advantage and, per-
haps, a regulatory advantage as well in penetrating that market.
As the authors argue, Hong Kong’s well-developed commercial banking
sector is likely to beneﬁt from an expanding Chinese market. However,
given the dominance of banks in China’s ﬁnancial system, decisions about
the future geographical location of commercial banking are likely to be de-
cided for public policy reasons. Looking at the U.S. example, we can recall
that the Glass-Steagall act was passed to deliberately shape the geography
of banking power in the United States. Decision making about the shape
of the banking sector in China is likely to be no less political in China.
Equity Markets
Both Hong Kong and Shanghai have large equity markets. According to
the World Federation of Exchanges, in May 2007, both markets had capi-
talizations of slightly larger than US$1 trillion. Between 1993 and 2005,
mainland ﬁrms raised more than $100 billion in equity oﬀerings in Hong
Kong (Hong Kong Yearbook 2005, chapter 4). In 2005 and 2006, three of
the Big Four Chinese state-owned banks had large initial public oﬀerings
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trated in Shanghai (see Kwong, Tucker, and Gangahar 2007). In the imme-
diate term, central government policy is likely to drive the location of eq-
uity business in China.
In the longer term, thick market externalities (see Diamond 1982) may
be a more dominant factor in moving China’s equity markets to a single ge-
ographical location. Substantial time series evidence (see Amihud 2002;
Pastor and Stambaugh 2003; and Acharya and Pedersen 2005) has shown
that the degree of aggregate market liquidity has strong eﬀects on equity
prices. If market locations also beneﬁt in the long run from being very liq-
uid, then the increasing returns to scope and scale that would come from
concentrating all listings in one market might make it more eﬃcient to have
a single major equity market in China, whether that would be in Shanghai
or Hong Kong.
Bond Markets
It can deﬁnitely be said that Hong Kong is an international center for
bond issuance. Compared to some other developed anglophone countries,
the Hong Kong dollar international bond market is relatively large. In
2005, the outstanding stock of international Hong Kong dollar bonds was
38 percent of Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP) compared to the
Canadian dollar international bond market being 14 percent of Canada’s
GDP, the Australian dollar market being 21 percent of Australian GDP,
and New Zealand being 35 percent.1 At that same point in time, the ren-
minbi international bond market was negligible.
It is not clear, however, that this implies that Hong Kong can generate a
signiﬁcant fraction of its GDP by being a bond issuing center for China as
a whole. Hong Kong’s better standards of corporate governance would give
it a comparative advantage in issuing corporate bonds rather than public-
sector bonds, which might be more easily traded in Beijing. However, nei-
ther Hong Kong nor China’s domestic corporate bond markets are partic-
ularly well developed. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) report
that in 2003, the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector rel-
ative to outstanding domestic debt securities issued by the corporate sector
was above 150 to 1 in China and above 45 to 1 in Hong Kong. In a market
so dominated by banking, the corporate debt market may continue to be
less signiﬁcant.
Derivative Markets
In the 2004 data cited by the authors, forex and interest rate derivative
trading was much larger in Hong Kong than in Shanghai. However, a more
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1. These ﬁgures are calculated using data on the stock of bonds from the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (2007) and from data on GDP from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators.global comparison may oﬀer some perspective. For example, the authors
report that in April 2004 that the monthly average of the over-the-counter
trading in interest rate derivatives in Hong Kong was approximately
US$11 billion. On a good month in 2006, the trading in interest rate prod-
ucts at the Hong Kong Futures Exchange (see Hong Kong Exchange and
Clearing 2007) was about HK$1 billion. As a comparison, on any given
day in 2006, about 2 million interest rate contracts with a total notional
value of US$2 trillion were traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
The point is not to compare Hong Kong’s market negatively with the
longest existing ﬁnancial derivatives markets. However, in comparison
with the ultimate size of China’s needs in terms of trading interest rate risk,
Hong Kong’s current lead may not prove decisive.
Conclusion
To help us further understand Hong Kong’s future role as an interna-
tional ﬁnancial center, speciﬁc discussion of the SAR’s role as an interme-
diary for the ﬂow of funds between the mainland and foreign countries
would be useful. As the authors note, both Hong Kong and Shanghai op-
erated as symbiotic banking centers in the prewar era. Clearly, that was the
product of a speciﬁc series of historical circumstances. Hong Kong’s rela-
tively sophisticated economy, well-regulated market, and liberal interna-
tional policies have granted the region a very well-developed ﬁnancial sys-
tem with a great deal of participation by multinational ﬁnancial companies.
However, given the early stage of development of China’s own ﬁnancial
markets, Hong Kong’s real existing advantages are insuﬃcient to guarantee
a continued role in the future equivalent to the current day. Much will de-
pend on policy decision made in Hong Kong and Beijing. Current develop-
ments provide grounds for optimism. Up to the current day, policy changes
are being made that should make it easier and more proﬁtable for Hong
Kong’s ﬁnancial sector to act as a ﬁnancial entrepôt.
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Comment Peter Nicholas Kriz
Introduction
In a rather provocative chapter, McCauley and Chan use a combination
of descriptive statistics and counterfactual estimations to persuade readers
of two facts regarding Hong Kong’s fate as international ﬁnancial center.
One, Hong Kong possesses marked leadership over Shanghai in interna-
tional banking, foreign exchange, derivatives, capital market development,
and internationalization, and these current advantages are of importance
for how one should consider their futures. Two, recent trends portend a
growing rather than diminishing gap in favor of Hong Kong with respect
to the relative ﬁnancial strength of these two cities. In light of their ﬁnd-
ings, the authors conclude that rather than weaken in the face of China’s
renaissance, Hong Kong’s position as the de facto center of international
ﬁnance in China should strengthen, and its ﬁnancial leadership over
Shanghai be retained.
My comments on this chapter are organized into three sections. First, I
ask a number of questions issues related to Hong Kong’s strength relative
to Shanghai. In doing so, I provide some needed context to the interpreta-
tion of current data and future projections. Second, I critically discuss the
main analytical feature of the chapter, the counterfactual estimation. I ap-
proach their ﬁndings from four theoretical considerations, each of which
oﬀers a diﬀerent characterization of future expectations and suggests a
more holistic perspective on the counterfactuals. Finally, I conclude with a
few parting thoughts on economic research on China and other emerging
markets.
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